The legacy of Travis Kalanick and Uber after 10 years, what’s the ride-hailing market in Vietnam?

On January 5, 2010, Travis Kalanick posted a tweet that would later be a life story for those who know Uber.
“Looking 4 entrepreneurial product mgr / biz-dev killer 4 a location based service .. pre-launch, BIG equity, big peeps involved— ANY TIPS ??”
(Looking for product management comrade / business development killer Entrepreneurial entrepreneurship, a location-based service … coming soon, BIG stakes, some big guys have joined – do you have any advice?)

In response to the Uber founder, there was only one sentence “heres a tip. Email me   ***@***.*** ”so he was accepted as the CEO of Uber in the beginning.

Let’s take a moment to talk about American true entrepreneurship, which is why Americans are so successful on a large scale, that is “open”.

Than is the founder, received a neat response, still proactively answered, not arrogant and arrogant like “our stratup people”, when there are achievements, they are very arrogant … in general, I find Vietnamese people very good but, in part, they did not value each other, did not unite, everyone thought they were good so they worked hard, so they only achieved a certain number of achievements but it was too hard to go as far as Americans, who Japan, Mainland Chinese, Korean …


Since then, Uber has introduced a new definition of sharing economy, translating into Vietnamese as “Sharing economy”.

Uber initially developed peer-2-peer ride sharing then ride-hailing service … With these two models, Uber has been spreading worldwide … disrupting markets around the globe …

At that time, people became economists, talking about the Sharing Economy, the home talking about the Sharing Economy. The startup community often defines them as “Uber 4 something” in the sharing economy, to describe the model in the most concise way when elevator pitching for VCs, Angel Investors.

Nhận thấy đây là một virus mới trong làng công nghệ thế giới, Travis, khôn như Cún, đã lên kế hoạch đồng hóa thị trường bản địa, với một quyết sách duy nhất: “release open source code để cho các local businesses nhanh chóng cùng tham gia vào cuộc chơi”.

Travis làm việc này vì hai điều:
1. Đây là một mô hình disrupting market. Phá vỡ hoàn toàn mô hình taxi truyền thống và các ngành nghề align khác trong tương lai. Điều này sẽ động chạm đến “lợi ích” của người bản xứ ở mỗi quốc gia.
2. Vì là một hot trend, môt mô hình tương lai nên sooner or later các local businesses cũng nhảy vào. Không thể nào ngăn họ được.

Travis đã cho releasing open source code của Uber, một nước cờ, sẽ tạm thời giải quyết cả hai vấn đề cho quân tiền trạm.

Sau đó Uber thực hiện quyết sách thứ hai: globalize locals.

Mở rộng trên khắp mọi mặt trận, nhảy vào các thị trường locals để dẫn đầu cuộc chơi… Chỗ nào taxi đình công thì làm dậy sóng. Chỗ nào lobby được và legally thì gây tiếng vang lớn. Như thế là virus “sharing economy” lan rộng khắp toàn cầu…

Tháng 12 năm 2015, Masa Son nhúng bàn tay của mình vào, hợp nhất các đối thủ sừng sỏ của Uber trải dài từ Tây bán cầu có Lyft (Mỹ) sang đến Đông bán cầu với Didi Chuxing (China), Ola Cabs (India) và Grab (SEA) và gọi đó là một Alliance các dịch vụ nền tảng.

– Ở Việt Nam, Masa dàn xếp Uber mua lại cổ phần Grab và rút khỏi Việt Nam. Uber hưởng lợi dựa trên ROI, Grab hưởng lợi market shares, Masa hưởng lợi trên giá trị đầu tư với những toan tính khác (IPO), Alliance hưởng lợi khi phân chia lãnh thổ cắt lỗ. Muôn đường lợi.
– Tương tự như vậy ở Trung Hoa Đại Lục, Didi mua lại Uber…

Perhaps this was Masa’s wrong decision, which should have been done after Uber’s IPO, Masa could not have lost such a large amount of money from the failed IPO plan as planned by Uber. It is better to keep Uber in some locals until post IPO.

Perhaps that is why Grab has quickly pivoting the model into a fintech to scale up. Grab is about to establish Grab Bank (Digital), while local businesses are struggling to expand their market share.

Following is the progress of Uber-like business models in Vietnam market:

# Uber
Uber entered Vietnam in 2014. By 2018, it will sell all of its business in Southeast Asia to gain a 27.5% stake in Grab. Invest about 700M USD in the SEA market, earning 27.5% x 7.7B USD (estimated market value in 2018) ~ 2.11B USD without doing anything. Softbank is too wise to choose this exit strategy.

# Easy-taxi
Easy-taxi is from Clone Group, Rocket Internet, from Germany. Easy one-time taxi operation is poor. The reason is that the next round of funding cannot be called after spending millions of USD on the Vietnamese market.

# Didi
Didi intends to jump into the Vietnamese market so that in every country Softbank covers the entire market share. But still the story of? Exit strategy. Didi easy comes, eassy goes. Arriving in Vietnam quietly and then withdrawing quietly according to the plan of the Dan.

After that, the market was divided as follows:

The 01 is: Grabtaxi> Grab.

Grabtaxi operated in Vietnam after 2 years, rebranding to Grab, then 3 years later, pivoting, switching to a multi-platform service model, revolving around the core of Fintech with a backbone of location-based platform.
In 2018 Vinasun prepare was 8000 people unemployed because of Grab, suing, claiming compensation of 42 billion …
Taxi union council of 17 companies formed alliances to react quickly to “tech taxi companies” but you know, in What Vietnam calls an “alliance” is found only in wartime. Taxi Mai Linh leads the alliance, joins the game but then dies prematurely …

Just like that, Grab took the leading position, lasting to this day.

Monday is Go-Viet

GoViet invested by Go-Jek, a unicorn startup from Indonesia ( startup Unicorn is a startup with Valuation> 1B USD)
Go-Jek DECLARED invest US $ 500M in Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. In Vietnam, Go-Viet initially ran very well. When penetrating the market, focus on GoBike, not hug like other brands.

This is an extremely wise move to win Grab on a front, taking the pedal to do so. 2018 can say that GoBike is about to win Grab in this segment. But then the headquarters was opaque, Go-Jek had to recalculate. As mentioned, Uber’s unsuccessful IPO caused a stir among the industry giants. They faltered. Grab one step faster and pivoting right away.

Đến năm 2019 thì lình xình vụ cut off 2 vị trí cấp cao nhất của GoViet là CEO và COO nhưng vỗ về truyền thông một cách nhẹ nhàng để rồi sau đó mời chị Lê từ Facebook về tiếp quản. Chị này về theo kế sách “ve sầu thoát xác” và tiếp tục chạy Go-Viet. Mình nghĩ chị này rồi cũng sẽ đi. Có khi đi luôn cùng với Go-Viet…

Đến nay thì chiến lược Go-Viet chưa hề thay đổi, tập trung vào một phân khúc chính là Gobike và mở rộng Go-Food để song hành vị thế dẫn đầu cùng Grab. Chiến lược này thì các models của Việt Nam không thấy được. Cứ đi tập trung ride-hailing service.

“10 năm đã qua rồi”.

Một số bạn đưa ra lý do vấn đề giấy phép mà Go-Viet không thể chạy Go-Car… Đối với vấn đề giấy phép ở Việt Nam thì… thực tế coi như “sự đã rồi”.

Các law firms khi tư vấn cho các công ty nước ngoài nhảy vào Việt Nam thường nói 2 câu:
– Do you know “Năm Cam”?
[… ]
– What can’t be bought by money, by a lot of money…

Thứ 03 là Be

Be nghe bảo là một ông lớn, nhà đầu tư từ liên minh các ngân hàng trong nước. Chính vì thế nên đi rất chậm.
Nếu so sánh Grab thay đổi theo Tuần thì Be thay đổi theo Qúy.

Tuy nhiên Be làm rất bài bản, có thể nói so với một ông từ Silicon Valley về như Uber, thì Be một tám một mười. Cả về công nghệ và cách làm đều không thua kém gì. Tuy nhiên thế sự nay đã khác rồi.

“10 năm đã qua rồi”

Be form team còn hời hợt thành ra chậm hoặc lủng củng, có thể nói bộ máy vận hành không trơn tru.

Be selected the direction of penetrate market that Uber and Grab made 4 years ago, which means “expanding market share instead of developing services”, so it always goes after the first person. It is impossible to break through.

Should have gone in the same direction as Go-Viet, then in 1, 2 years can jump to the top position right away in the same segment, marketers or so-called niche markets.

Be goes in the classic direction: If you want to dig deep, you have to dig first, but that is slow, so Be’s strategy is to expand to the provinces while consolidating the rear at Saigon headquarters. This is a difficult problem.

On the internet, after 6 months is already very slow, over these 4 years, not to mention resources correlation. The fastest way is to build cross-platform by partnering with other business models with none-conflict-of-interest to leapfrog.

Be should be fourth after Fastgo because Be joined later, but …

Wednesday is FastGo

FastGo is quite good in terms of technology, I use it many times, feel very satisfied and very proud … However, when the operation is off course.

FastGo likes to call it glossy, perhaps to raise funds rather than focusing on long-term strategy development.
– In the country, FastGo chose to confront Grab directly in the “Calling” segment: considered failed. The direction is completely wrong.
– Abroad, the direction of FastGo is similar to Uber 5 years ago, attacked the domestic market to compete with other local leaders, while at home lost gradually foothold: The direction is also wrong.

At the moment, FastGo is basically like an empty bin shouting. Doing not methodically, when you have money, what would you do? When you run out of money, you will be silent. Like fancy glossy then faded, then fancy fancy flashy … Maybe failed after about 2 years if you go on like that. FastGo’s approach is the complete opposite of the way Be does. Be doing is still better.

Thursday is FaceCar> Vivu> Vato

Vato is really a tragedy. The predecessor, FaceCar, was born in 2017, later changed its name to Vivu when restructuring shareholders.
It can be said in Vietnam, Vivu is one of the “small but martial” startups in this field.

Vivu is very good, the app is very good and smooth, like Uber style … See, at that time, besides Grab, the rest was Go-Viet, Vivu. I used to like Vivu.

Vivu does branding pretty well. On the way of growth, Vietnamese overseas investors were stuck with the famous Vietnamese Kieu, who had a reputation for not having pieces, then gradually got lost in the market.

Following the direction of the 4.0 revolution of the state, Phuong Trang (Futa) has decided not to follow Vinasun’s downfall, blowing a new breeze when investing in Vivu. Listen where is more than 2000 billion. But actually about 200 billion. Renamed it Vato and changed it into a brandidentity suit. I don’t know why I put a socialist model on a capitalist app. How many media seals does Futa pull Vato down for?

Futa shouted the slogan but did not know how to make technology into Vato. Should have been throwing money to let Vivu run now has Top3 market already.

It is expected that Vato is about to be transformed into the Futa Vehicle Management App because the tower cannot float. If I were the CEO of “Vivu” then I would divest immediately. It seems like meeting time without meeting people. The number of Vato to the beginning of 2020 is stopped, that is, in this field.

Friday is Tada

Tada from Singapore, is a project to raise capital through the form of ICO. Quite successful. Say that blockchain projects actually only issue tokens and pay rewards for the ride-hailing app’s business service.
Tada doesn’t come to Vietnam. Tada’s plan is just for fun, to develop his cryptocurrency at SEA, contributing to the promotion of Blockchain 3.0: the Dapps era. Sooner or later, they will withdraw from Vietnam.

Saturday is MyGo

Viettel’s MyGo has just been born, in June 2019. Mygo was born for the goal of Viettel’s digital transformation.

Basically, Viettel’s ecosystem does not lack anything, only that is the old technology, it will not be suitable with the current trend, so now Viettel wants to convert all the platforms it has with applied technology. Use current trends to prepare for the future.

For example, in the field of logistics, with GPS detecting & tracking tool, it can run logistic well but the world changed so fast that Viettel had to quickly change itself. It can be said that Viettel is changing itself on every front.

MyGo was born in accordance with that philosophy, but when doing it, “greed”. MyGo not only solve one problem but two difficult problems, which can be said to be more difficult than Be’s game.
– Talk about the ride-hailing market. Jumping into direct competition is like Don Quixote and its windmill.
– Talking about the derivative market from the ride-hailing platform is logistic, there are Ahamove, Ninja Van (Grab bought), Lalamove, Gogovan (GogoX) in Vietnam + Grab, Go-Viet, Be, FastGo when they Open more business categories.

MyGo’s current job is like piloting to explore market share, I only have suggestions, if I do:

– Digital transforming Viettel’s logistics segment when opening up and focusing on a certain industry next to Viettel Post, specifically here is F&B to jump straight along with Grab, along with Go-Viet. So create cauldron of Vac.

– Develop the Viettelpay cross-platform with MyGo to make one, save resources … and many other services.

– Developing multidisciplinary services for transportation including E-commerce that Viettel has just built, Seashells, https://voso.vn/

If Be and Viettel do well, in the next two years, this Top3 market will be: Grab, Be, MyGo

 

Written by Hung kaka
Editor: Doocvii